






































































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 







Case No. 19-cv-01003-JST   
 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Re: ECF No. 14 
 
 
Before the Court is Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s motion to dismiss.  ECF No. 14.  The 
Court will grant the motion in full. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Ibrahim Hassan, Anjeza Hassan, Kosta Hysa, and Mirela Hysa are Facebook 
users who created accounts between 2007 and 2009.  ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 3-6.  Plaintiffs 
used the Facebook Messenger application to communicate with others via calls and instant 
messages.  Id.  They shared “personal, intimate, secure information” via Messenger including 
“current addresses, social security numbers, birthdays, driver licenses, personal and intimate 
pictures, personal and intimate conversations, and life-making decisions.”  Id. ¶ 12.  They assert 
that Facebook, “without authorization, exposed all the above data collected from all four Plaintiffs 
for its own financial gain.”  Id. ¶ 10. 
Plaintiffs now bring suit against Facebook asserting three causes of action.  First, Plaintiffs 
plead that Facebook violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) by falsely 
representing that their “personal data were secured and private” and by “failing to implement 
reasonable and appropriate security measures or follow industry standards for data security, and 
failing to comply with its own posted privacy policies.”  Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.  Specifically, Plaintiffs 





































































complain of the harvesting and selling of data to Cambridge Analytica, as well as Facebook 
“allow[ing] over 150 companies to access and use [their] personal data for its own monetary 
profits, without [their] permission and consent.”  Id. ¶ 18.  Second, Plaintiffs allege public 
disclosure of private facts based on Facebook giving companies such as Netflix, Spotify, and the 
Royal Bank of Canada access to “read, write, and delete” their private messages without consent.  
Id. ¶¶ 22-23.  Third, Plaintiffs allege breach of contract based on Facebook’s “fail[ure] to comply 
with its own user agreement knowing that it is misusing our personal information.”  Id. ¶ 26.  
Plaintiffs seek damages in the amount of $5,000,000.  Id. ¶ 32. 
Facebook now moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  ECF No. 14.  Plaintiffs 
oppose.  ECF No. 29.  Facebook has filed a reply.  ECF No. 30. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Id.  In determining whether a plaintiff has met this plausibility standard, the Court 
accepts all factual allegations as true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 
III. DISCUSSION 
For the reasons below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with leave to amend. 
A. Claim One 
Facebook contends that “Plaintiffs’ first cause of action must be dismissed because the 
FTC Act does not create a private right of action.”  ECF No. 14 at 6.  Facebook is correct.  “The 
[FTC] Act nowhere purports to confer upon private individuals, either consumers or business 
competitors, a right of action to enjoin the practices prohibited by the Act or to obtain damages 





































































following the commission of such acts.”  Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988-89 
(D.C. Cir. 1973).  Courts have consistently held “that consumers and members of the public at 
large may not maintain a private action to enforce the FTCA.”  Gajo v. Chicago Brand, Case No. 
17-cv-00380-EMC, 2017 WL 2473142, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2017).  Accordingly, “private 
litigants may not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal district courts by alleging that defendants 
engaged in business practices proscribed by” the Act.  Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 
(9th Cir. 1981).   
For this reason, Plaintiffs’ first claim fails as a matter of law.  When granting a motion to 
dismiss, the court should grant leave to amend “unless it determines that the pleading could not 
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”  Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Because there are no facts that can cure 
Plaintiffs’ legally defective claim under the FTC Act, that claim is dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Claim Two 
To state a claim for public disclosure of private facts under California law, a plaintiff must 
allege “(1) public disclosure, (2) of a private fact, (3) which would be offensive and objectionable 
to the reasonable person, and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.”  Taus v. Loftus, 40 
Cal. 4th 683, 717 (2007).  Facebook argues that “Plaintiffs fail to allege what specific facts were 
disclosed by Facebook, when, to whom, and how.”  ECF No. 14 at 7.  First, Facebook points out 
that Plaintiffs do not identify what part of their personal information was exposed or why that 
information is private.  Id.  Relatedly, Plaintiffs do not explain how that exposure would be 
offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.  Id. at 8.  Second, Facebook emphasizes that 
Plaintiffs do not allege that Facebook publicized their private information to the public at large.  
Id. at 9.  Finally, Facebook notes that Plaintiffs fail to plead that Facebook acted with knowledge 
or reckless disregard of the fact that a reasonable person would consider the publicity at issue 
highly offensive.  Id. at 10. 
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to survive a motion to 
dismiss their claim for public disclosure of private facts.  While Plaintiffs assert that “Facebook 
exposed [their] privacy, personal information, personal messages, and personal activities to known 





































































and unknown companies without consent,” Compl. ¶ 23, they do not identify the content of the 
messages that were exposed or what makes the exposed information personal or private.  As in 
another case in this district alleging invasion of privacy claims, “[t]he problem for Plaintiffs . . . is 
that to the extent Plaintiffs intend to allege that they have a privacy interest in the specific content 
of their emails” – or in this case, instant messages – “their allegations are fatally conclusory.  The 
Complaint merely alleges that Plaintiffs’ [messages] were ‘private’ without alleging any facts 
related to what particular [messages Defendant] intercepted, or the content within particular 
[messages].”  In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  As in Yahoo, 
Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of exposure of their “private messages” fail to state a claim. 
Plaintiffs also fail to allege that Facebook publicized their information.  “Liability for the 
common-law tort [of public disclosure of private facts] requires publicity; disclosure to a few 
people in limited circumstances does not violate the right.”  Ignat v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 214 Cal. 
App. 4th 808, 820 (2013).  Publicity “means that the matter is made public, by communicating it 
to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially 
certain to become one of public knowledge.”  Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1062 
(N.D. Cal. 2014).  Here, Plaintiffs assert broadly that Facebook allowed “known and unknown 
companies” to access their private messages.  Compl. ¶ 23.  Without more, the Court cannot 
conclude that Facebook communicated the information at issue to so many persons that the 
information was substantially certain to become public knowledge.  Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to 
plead the publicity element of their claim, another deficiency demanding dismissal. 
For the reasons above, Claim Two, pleading public disclosure of private facts, is 
dismissed.  However, because Plaintiffs could potentially cure their claim by alleging additional 
facts, dismissal of Claim Two is with leave to amend. 
C. Claim Three 
“Under California law, to state a claim for breach of contract a plaintiff must plead the 
contract, plaintiffs’ performance (or excuse for nonperformance), defendant’s breach, and damage 
to plaintiff therefrom.”  Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
Facebook argues that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim fails because Plaintiffs do not identify the 





































































contract provision Facebook allegedly breached.  ECF No. 14 at 10.  The Court agrees, and will 
dismiss the claim on this basis.  Without identifying, in the complaint, the specific contractual 
provisions alleged to have been breached, Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded the contract.  See, 
e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (Without 
“refer[ring] to any contractual language or any contractual provisions that [Defendant] allegedly 
breached . . . Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements . . . are insufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss.”); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“In an action 
for breach of a written contract, a plaintiff must allege the specific provisions in the contract 
creating the obligation the defendant is said to have breached.”). 
Facebook also argues, again correctly, that that Plaintiffs have failed to make out a legally 
cognizable claim for damages.  ECF No. 14 at 11.  The complaint alleges that Facebook’s 
exposure of data “brings us the Plaintiffs at a high risk of our lives and security.  Knowing that 
more than 150 companies and their employees have all of our private information keeps us under 
harm and fear not just for our lives but our children.”  Compl. ¶ 13.  To the extent that Plaintiffs’ 
damages claims are based on emotional distress, the claims are not cognizable under California 
law.  See Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (“Emotional and physical distress damages are not 
recoverable on a California contract claim.”); Svenson v. Google Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 717, 725 
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (Increased risk of identity theft is “too speculative to satisfy the pleading 
requirement of contract damages.”); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d, 380 F. App’x 689 (9th Cir. 2010) (Under California contract law, a Plaintiff “cannot show 
he was actually damaged by pointing to his fear of future identity theft.”).  Plaintiffs must plead 
legally cognizable contract damages to state a contract claim.  Because they have not done so, 
Claim Three is dismissed on this additional basis. 
Because the Court concludes that the allegation of additional facts may cure Plaintiffs’ 
breach of contract claim, dismissal of Claim Three is without prejudice. 
/ / / 
/ / /  
/ / / 






































































For the reasons above, Facebook’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the Court dismisses 
the complaint in full.  Dismissal of Claim One is with prejudice.  Claims Two and Three are 
dismissed with leave to amend within thirty days of the date of this order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  July 23, 2019 
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 
Case 3:19-cv-01003-JST   Document 32   Filed 07/23/19   Page 6 of 6
